Maryland Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 1

Article 7

Legal Epistemologies
Howard Schweber

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legal History
Commons
Recommended Citation
75 MD. L. REV. 210 (2015)

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGIES
HOWARD SCHWEBER ∗
I. LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGIES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
“A pregnant woman walks into a bar.” That is not the beginning of a
tasteless joke, it was the beginning of a criminal prosecution. The (very
visibly, eight-month) pregnant woman in question is known to the State of
Wisconsin as Deborah J.Z. 1 This was one of several cases that made headlines in the late 1990s. A survey of cases between 1973 and 2007 finds 418
instances of prosecutions brought against pregnant women based on claims
of conduct that posed a risk of harm to the fetus. The conduct in these cases
ranged from illegal drug use (eighty-four percent of cases) to refusal of
medical treatment or refusal of delivery by caesarian section. The defendants, unsurprisingly, have disproportionately been women of color and/or
lower socioeconomic status. 2
These moves involve an intersection of a number of elements: abortion
politics, the increasing popularity of the idea of “fetal rights,” and the general surrender of privacy to government authority imposed as a condition of
interactions—voluntary or not—with state agencies. 3 Yet while these political factors may explain the increase in the enactment of statutes and the
conduct of prosecutors, they leave out an important conceptual element that
makes it possible to readily translate political attitudes into legal arguments.
The discussion of fetal rights is a good example. Katha Pollitt sums up the
critique of such arguments nicely. “Pro-choice activists rightly argue that
© 2015 Howard Schweber.
∗
Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. The woman’s real name has long since been released in the press, but I see no reason to
repeat that violation of privacy here—a point which arguably has some relevance to this entire
discussion.
2. See Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant
Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public
Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 300 (2013); see also Sarah Letitia Kowalski, Looking
for a Solution: Determining Fetal Status for Prenatal Drug Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1255 (1998); Jean Reith Schroedel, Pamela Fiber & Bruce D. Snyder, Women’s
Rights and Fetal Personhood in Criminal Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 113 (2011); Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F.
25 (2008); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
643 (2009); Dawn E. Johnson, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L.
REV. 931 (1995).
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antiabortion and fetal-rights advocates grant fetuses more rights than women. A point less often made is that they grant fetuses more rights than twoyear-olds—the right, for example, to a safe, healthy place to live.” 4 The
idea of fetal rights is one that has never been recognized under either the
United States or state constitutions, although that has not stopped state legislatures from employing the idea, and someday courts may decide to adopt
that vocabulary as well. But as Pollitt’s comment points out, even if courts
were to accept the idea that fetuses have rights, those rights would have to
be balanced against the undoubted rights of persons to bodily liberty. The
outcomes in particular cases may be inconsistent with liberal norms, but the
language of traditional, negative, liberal “rights” provides a perfectly adequate basis for criticizing those outcomes even if something called “fetal
rights” were to be added to the discursive mix. 5 To put the matter another
way, the criminal prosecution or preventive detention of a pregnant woman
seen drinking in public would have been unthinkable fifty years ago. What
changed?
It is possible that critics of state intervention in pregnancy are mistaken to focus on the case as sui generis. Far from representing an abandonment of governing norms, the logic justifying state action in these cases is
inherent in the model of the public/private divide that currently informs
American legal discourse.
Focusing on the public/private divide, rather than on the “right to privacy,” is an approach that turns away from the language of rights to a
broader consideration of the principles that legitimize state action in the
first instance. The power of the state is not limited to the vindication of
rights, nor is it the case that the state’s interests necessarily give way any
time a claim of right is asserted. There are obviously profound questions of
rights involved in this discussion, but their resolution takes place against a
background understanding of “public” and “private” as categories of political legitimation.
The basic formulation of Millean liberalism is the idea of a private
sphere, defined as the area of “self-directed” activities, meaning those that
have no direct consequences for others except by their voluntary agreement.
The idea that self-directed conduct is outside the reach of legitimate public
4. Katha Pollitt, “Fetal Rights”: A New Assault on Feminism, in “BAD” MOTHERS: THE
POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 285, 292 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri
Umansky eds., 1998).
5. For a discussion of a similar warning against overstating the importance of recognizing
fetal rights in the abortion context, see MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL
CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 16–38 (1996). For a discussion of
the ways in which an expansive notion of negative liberty can be used to craft a far-reaching feminist critique of legal practices, see Nancy J. Hirschmann, Revisioning Freedom: Relationship,
Context and Politics of Empowerment, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL: FEMINIST
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY 51–74 (Nancy
J. Hirschmann & Christine DiStefano eds., 1996).
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control is the central premise of liberalism. This is not to say that Mill was
anything like a modern libertarian. For one thing, the conduct that is
properly subject to public authority encompasses a broad range. For another, Mill was perfectly comfortable with the idea that there is a category of
conduct that is a proper subject of social pressure even though it is not so
consequential as to warrant coercive interventions. Here again, however,
the question turns on whether the conduct affects anyone other than the actor. 6 The Millean liberal conception of the public/private divide has been
the subject of endless and often fruitful critique on republican, feminist, and
other grounds. And there are certainly other conceptions of “privacy.”7
But the basic idea that “public” means “affecting others” has been, and remains, a central element of the legal conception of “privacy.”
Returning to the case of Deborah J.Z., this observation identifies the
underlying reasoning that justifies intervention. The public understanding
that drinking alcohol while pregnant poses a risk to the future-born child—
treated as an “other”—satisfies both the Millean requirement of otherdirected consequences and the police powers formulation of health, safety,
welfare, and morals. But that answer begs important questions. Similar
prosecutions would have been considered outrageous fifty years earlier.
What governing conceptions are at work in the proposition that a legislature
can legitimately regulate the conduct of pregnant women in ways that
would not have been considered reasonable in earlier eras?
The answer, I will argue, is the emergence of a new legal epistemology. New ways of conceiving cause and effect, harm, and risk were incorporated into legal thinking, resulting in a reconfiguration of the public/private
divide. A similar expansion in the understanding of causation and harm had
previously taken place in the 1930s. In that period, a new model based on
the idea of “markets” shattered older conceptions of privity and opened
whole new categories of public interest and authority. The market conception of the public/private divide was driven by the pervasiveness of new
forms of economic activity in the structure of corporate industrial capitalism, and new ways of thinking promoted by the emergence of the social
scientific disciplines. In the 1970s, the new model was ecological. Ideas of
causation and harm were reconceived as descriptions of effects occurring
within complex systems of interacting elements rather than discrete, particular events. In this model, a pregnant woman ingesting alcohol is analo-

6. JOHN STUART MILL, J.S. MILL: ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS (Classic Books Int’l.
2010) (1851).
7. Beatte Rössler identifies five distinct versions of the ideal of privacy, of which the most
general is “a condition in which one is protected in various respects from the unwanted interference of others.” Beatte Rössler, Privacies: An Overview, in PRIVACIES: PHILOSOPHICAL
EVALUATIONS 1, 7–9 (Beatte Rössler ed., 2004).
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gous to a polluter, as the cause of the harm or risk is conduct affecting the
gestational environment rather than an act of physical violence. 8
What occurred in the 1930s and the 1970s is occurring again today,
not in relation to either economic or biological understandings, but in terms
of the legal epistemology that is employed in the conception of public and
private information. Now as then, new patterns of interaction and new
ways of thinking threaten to undermine the coherence of a perceived understanding of the public/private divide. The forces driving change, as always,
are both empirical and intellectual. Empirically, the driving force has been
the rise of new technologies of communication that have permitted, if not
required, entirely new ways of social and economic interaction. Intellectually, the shift is to an understanding that people live simultaneously in a
physically defined local environment and in the unbounded realm of networks. These changes in the ways people live challenge the existing legal
epistemology of privacy.
There is an interesting historical story to be told here about the intellectual dominance of particular fields. The early decades of the 1900s were
the period in which economics emerged as a central field of intellectual endeavor; the 1980s were the period in which the biological sciences are said
to have displaced physics in the postwar intellectual pantheon, particularly
with the dominance of evolutionary and genetic models (think of “genetic
algorithms” in computational science).9 By the same token, it may be argued that we are living through a period in which the science(s) of information are rapidly taking over as the dominant source of metaphors, models, and methods across a broad range of intellectual endeavors.
II. MARKETS AND ECOLOGIES
A. “For the Larger Benefit of All”
The first modern shift in legal epistemology in the modern era was evidenced by the change in reasoning that occurred between Lochner v. New

8. In 2014, Tennessee adopted a law permitting a woman to be charged with assault if she is
found to have ingested narcotics outside of a treatment program while pregnant, if a subsequently
born live child is found to have suffered harm, or exhibits drug dependency. Assoc’d Press, Tennessee: Governor Signs Bill Targeting Drug Use During Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/us/tennessee-governor-signs-bill-targeting-drug-use-duringpregnancy.html. A similar bill is under consideration in Oklahoma. Oklahoma Watch & M. Scott
Carter, Bill Would Penalize Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, KGOU (Mar. 7, 2015),
kgou.org/post/bill-would-penalize-pregnant-women-who-use-drugs. These bills may be taken as
indications that an ecological conception of harm has become so internalized within legal discourse that it is no longer necessary to treat such claims as somehow separate from traditional categories.
9. Freeman Dyson, Our Biotech Future, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 9, 2007),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/jul/19/our-biotech-future/.
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York 10 and the cases that accepted expanded notions of both state and federal power in the 1930s. 11 This momentous shift in constitutional doctrine has
been studied and debated to death, with a significant amount of attention
paid to the ways in which new legal doctrines reflected shifts in the understanding of the public/private divide. Without either endorsing or disputing
the main schools of thought about changes in legal doctrines, however, I
want to examine the shift in thinking about fundamental concepts of causation and harm that were articulated in the process of arriving at those new
legal principles. 12
In Lochner, as in the other cases of its period, the question of whether
the State was properly asserting police powers was understood in terms of
direct threats to the health or well-being of the actors immediately involved
in a situation: workers facing immediate threats of injury, purchasers of potentially unsafe or unwholesome products, or extraordinarily unhealthful
working conditions. Writing for the majority in Lochner, Justice Peckham
rejected two kinds of claimed harms. The first included gradual, slowlyaccreting health effects from ordinary activities: “It is unfortunately true labor, even in any department, may possibly carry with it the seeds of unhealthiness. But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative majorities?” 13 Here, the slippery slope argument points to the danger (from
Justice Peckham’s perspective) of allowing extended conceptions of health
effects to be the basis for intervention. The application of this argument
drew Justice Harlan’s ire, as he pointed out that evidence was presented that
baking was in fact an unwholesome occupation to an exceptional degree.
Second, in a move Justice Holmes criticized, Justice Peckham rejected the
idea that regulation of economic relations between individuals could be a
matter of public “welfare”: “Viewed in the light of a purely labor law . . . a
law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the

10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Home Blgd. & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
12. The discussion in this Paper does not seek to take any position on the controversies surrounding the question of how we ought to understand Lochner v. New York, but seeks only to suggest an observation that may or may not resonate with other readings. A very partial list of those
readings includes: DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS (1993);
PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (Peter Charles Hoffer &
N.E. H. Hull eds., 1998); Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009); Howard
Schweber, Lochner v. New York and the Challenge of Legal Historiography, 39 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 242 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
13. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
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welfare of the public, and . . . the interest of the public is not in the slightest
degree affected by such an act.” 14
It is striking to compare Lochner to the discussion of the minimum
wage law in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. 15 For one thing, in West
Coast Hotel Justice Hughes understood that negotiation for wages in a particular case takes place in the context of a general labor market that effectively sets conditions for individual participants. Second, Justice Hughes
took for granted the continued existence of a social welfare system, and
viewed the operation of private business in light of their relations to such
public operations:
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well being, but casts a direct burden for
their support upon the community. What these workers lose in
wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met. . . . The community is not bound to provide
what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.16
Justice Hughes emphasized the public interest in the overall conditions of
the labor market taken as a whole system rather than focusing on the question of the public interest in a particular employment relationship. He stated:
The legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils
of the “sweating system,” the exploiting of workers at wages so
low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living, thus making their very helplessness the occasion of a most injurious competition. The legislature had the right to consider that its minimum wage requirements would be an important aid in carrying
out its policy of protection.17
The point is emphasized repeatedly, as when Justice Hughes writes
that the restrictions upheld in Muller v. Oregon 18 were “not imposed solely
for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all,” 19 or quoted Holden v.
Hardy 20 for the proposition that the fact that the parties to a contract “are of
full age and competent to contract does not necessarily deprive the State of
the power to interfere where the parties do not stand upon an equality, or

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 57.
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Id. at 399.
Id. at 398–99.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 394–95 (quoting Muller, 208 U.S. at 422).
169 U.S. 366 (1898).
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where the public health demands that one party to the contract shall be protected against himself.” 21
It was not only the conception of the employment that was reworked in
response to a market model. Equally, concepts of risk and probability, indirect costs and consequences, and the consequences of inaction as well as
action have dramatically expanded our shared understandings of social responsibility, reflected in areas such as tort law. 22 The period from Lochner
to Wickard v. Filburn 23 was also the period of the emergence of professionalized social sciences, one of whose driving ideas was “interconnectedness”
of different areas of social activity. 24 The idea of an “economy” as something to be regulated, was a new addition to the vocabulary that made sensible the idea that regulation of labor markets affected the public welfare of
society writ large. It could even be argued that the very existence of a national, or even a statewide, “economy” was the result of improvements in
the technologies of communication and transportation that transformed the
landscape—literally and figuratively—from the mid-nineteenth century
onwards.
That shift in understanding reflected cultural and intellectual consequences of the emergence of new forms of economic and social organization that produced new ways of thinking about causation, harm, and complex interactions. In the economic arena, the shift was from viewing
transactions as isolated, independent events to seeing “the economy” and
“markets” as complex, interconnected systems in which events in one location have ripple effects across a network of related interactions to produce
effects in another. For want of a better term, this might be deemed “market
system” reasoning.
B. “Through Hindsight, Everything Is Foreseeable”
Just as the market conception of public effects was at the heart of the
1930s reconsideration of contract and property rights, the adoption of an
ecological model beginning in the 1970s reimagined tort and criminal law.
Munn v. Illinois 25 relied for its analysis on the image of grain elevators
standing at the “gateway” to a “toll” road of commerce. 26 In later cases, the
21. Id. at 393–94.
22. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916) (discussing
negligence liability of an auto manufacturer and noting that “the more probable the danger the
greater the need of caution”).
23. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
24. See generally THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2000) (1977); DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S
HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY (2013);
DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991).
25. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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idea of extended consequences increasingly took on the clothing of naturalistic metaphors exemplified in the phrase “the stream of commerce.” The
analogy of economic activity to the flow of a stream both naturalizes and,
by extension, valorizes the market system. At the same time, the adoption
of naturalistic metaphors conveys the notion that what is released into the
“stream” at one point will affect the rest of the downstream flow, and this
extended conception of consequences was precisely at stake in the expansion of government’s authority to regulate economic activities. In private
law, this model of outward-rippling waves of causation was developed in
new doctrines of “foreseeability,” by which actors would be required to
foresee the consequences of their actions and to guard against them up to
some arbitrary limit of probabilistic predictability.
“Foreseeability” was not a new idea in American law. In latenineteenth-century private law, foreseeability was employed by courts to
limit liability (for example, the doctrine of contributory negligence).27 In
the twentieth century, however, the concept took on entirely new meaning.
The connection between defining the boundary between public and private
and determining the scope of government policy forced American courts to
move into areas that challenged the traditional categories of legal thinking.
In playing this quasi-policymaking role, courts have had to wrestle with
problems of fitting traditional concepts of evidence and proof to the problems of balancing public benefits with private interests. “Foreseeability”
became the key point of connection between private rights and public policy. In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 28 Judge Cardozo described a
standard of “unreasonable hazard” based on knowledge of circumstances
and “ordinary vigilance” that defined the court-mandated duties. Applied
to corporations, these “private” duties took on both the function and the
form of a scheme of regulation.
The difficulty with Judge Cardozo’s approach is that the definition of
unreasonable hazard in terms of foreseeable consequences was something
entirely unrecognizable from a common law perspective that appealed to
the common understanding of the community. As noted earlier, by the
1920s, courts had begun to wrestle in earnest with prevalent social scientific
understandings that emphasized interconnectivity in social interactions and
the idea of economic systems. Assumptions about the commonplace understanding of terms like “cause” were threatened by these increasingly sophisticated modes of analysis. Oliver Wendell Holmes, in particular, wrestled
with the tension between new ways of conceiving foreseeable consequences

26. Id. at 132.
27. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992).
28. 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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and his conviction that legal liability should flow only from morally culpable conduct. An enthusiastic supporter of incorporating probabilistic and
statistical reasoning into legal reasoning, Justice Holmes promoted a standard of “foreseeability” that extended to whole industries and classes of person. 29 Conversely, he recognized that without a limiting principle of
blameworthiness—that persons should only be held liable for failing to
foresee consequences where such a failure was unreasonable—“any act
would be sufficient, however remote, which set in motion or opened the
door for a series of physical sequences ending in damage.” 30
The most profound alteration in the meaning of foreseeability, and
consequently in the reach of courts’ public, quasi-regulatory function, was
the introduction of the language of ecology in the 1970s, a process whose
beginning in public discourse can probably be marked at the publication of
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. 31 From that time forward, an ecological
model of hazard has become pervasive in political vocabulary. The incorporation into law of such a sophisticated understanding of causation, traditional in the natural sciences for a century, was absolutely necessary in light
of the far-reaching consequences of modern technologies. But the incorporation of such vocabularies threatens the stability of traditional categories of
legal thought inherited from an earlier age.32 Consciousness of the possibility of harms created through ecological processes of causation removed all
conceptual limits from the legal translation of private injuries into claims of
public good in both public and private law.
In public law, an exemplar of the ecological model of causation is a
statutory scheme such as the Comprehensive Environmental Reclamation
and Liability Act (“CERCLA,” also known as the “Superfund” law). 33 Under CERCLA, government agencies and private plaintiffs would not have to
demonstrate the specific act that led to the specific presence of a specific
pollutant; instead, it would be sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant had
released the pollutant in question into the environment in such a way that
the particular sample could have come from that source. The costs of cleanup would be spread among those defendants who were shown to have
“caused” the pollution in this characteristically ecological sense of the word

29. DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY 109
(1995).
30. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, 76–77 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) (1881).
31. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
32. For a discussion of both the acceptance and the limitations placed by courts on the use of
epidemiological evidence, see SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 126–34 (1995).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–28 (2012).
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“cause.” Other environmental statutes followed similar approaches to determining causation. 34
The ecological model of causation affected private law, as well,
spreading far beyond consideration of the natural environment to become
the basis for the discovery of bases of liability for exposure to secondhand
smoke, including the conclusion that exposure to such smoke constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of “current standards of decency.” 35 Ecological models of causation have been at the heart of “market
share” theories of liability that would hold drug or gun manufacturers liable
for their participation in markets that, taken as a whole, create an environment of risk to vulnerable plaintiffs, and as well the basis for arguments that
certain forms of speech are analogous to toxic pollutants of the political environment. 36 Robert George’s argument for restrictions on pornography illustrates the spread of the ecological metaphor beyond its original, biological sense:
What is true of public health and safety is equally true of public
morals. Take, as an example, the problem of pornography. Material designed to appeal to the prurient interest in sex by arousing
carnal desire . . . damages a community’s moral ecology in ways
analogous to those in which carcinogenic smoke spewing from a
factory’s stacks damages the community’s physical ecology. 37
The cases involving the harms of secondhand smoke are among the
most interesting exemplars of particular ways of thinking about harm, causation, and public duties. Significantly, regardless of the outcomes, courts
considering these claims have treated the harmful effects of secondhand
smoke to be a matter of public consciousness rather than a matter requiring
expert demonstration. These harmful effects “seem clear to a large proportion of the population,” observed the Seventh Circuit. 38 “[S]tandards of decency are indeed ‘evolving’ on the issue of smoking.” 39 A district court in
New York declared that the failure of prison officials to enforce existing
34. The Comprehensive Environmental Reclamation and Liability Act is essentially a statutory enactment that takes the form of tort liability. In addition, much of the action in Superfund
litigation involves the invocation of state common law tort theories of recovery, which are generally permitted in such litigation. One unfortunate historical result of this approach has been inconsistency in the formulation of standards for liability and remedies. See Howard Schweber,
Cleaning up the System: The Need for Federal Preemption of Third Party Contribution Claims
Under CERCLA, 12 TEMPLE ENVTL. L. & TECH. J., 187 (1993).
35. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
36. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 2000); Am. Booksellers’
Ass’n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 844
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); Sindell v. Abbott Lab, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
37. ROBERT P. GEORGE, CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN
CRISIS 92 (2001).
38. Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156, 157 (7th Cir. 1996).
39. Id. at 160.
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bans on smoking, “in light of the numerous commentaries and government
reports concerning [environmentally transmitted smoke], cannot be said to
be objectively reasonable.” 40 In some cases in which courts concluded that
employees have a right to a smoke-free workplace, no evidence was taken
on the issue of risk at all; instead, the harmfulness of secondhand smoke
was treated as a matter for “judicial notice,” a rule permitting courts to give
cognizance to commonly known facts that are neither in dispute in the case
nor matters for contention in the public mind. 41 And beginning in the
1990s, the possibility of exposure to secondhand smoke has been recognized as a relevant factor in determining child custody. 42
The model of ecological harms appears with a vengeance in cases in
which state authorities seek to regulate the conduct of pregnant women, including instances involving the dangers of smoking as well as drinking alcohol or using drugs. 43 In pursuing their mandate to determine acceptable
standards of conduct, courts’ adoption of ecological models of causation
makes it much harder to argue that a given area of conduct deserves the exceptional status of “private.”
Returning, again, to the early examples of aggressive intervention in
the 1990s consider the case of “Angela M.W.” 44 Angela’s obstetrician discovered evidence of drug use while she was pregnant. That statement alone
requires some consideration. Constructions of both responsible social practice and the technological enhancement to the disciplinary gaze of the medical community are invoked. As a matter of social practice, prenatal visits
to a medical professional are to be encouraged, because of the recognition
that interventions may be required to ensure that future citizens are not
harmed by imperfections in fetal environments. At the same time, the occurrence of a prenatal visit creates a moment of potentially unwanted visibility as a result of technologies that permit doctors to observe and evaluate
a range of environmental circumstances. Part of the point of conceiving an
“ecology” is that the interrelationships among events are not thought of as
the mysterious outcomes of a “black box” but rather as explicable, visualizable elements of the environment. Advances in visualization technologies
in the 1990s, such as ultrasound and amniocentesis, played a role in connecting the idea of a fetal environment to an ecological conception of causation and harm by rendering events inside the womb literally or metaphori-

40. Warren v. Keane, 937 F. Supp. 301, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
41. Smith v. W. Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Shimp v. N. J. Bell Tel. Co.,
368 A.2d 408, 414 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
42. Unger v. Unger, 644 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
43. See, e.g., LAURY OAKS, SMOKING AND PREGNANCY: THE POLITICS OF FETAL
PROTECTION 171–88 (2001).
44. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev’d, 561
N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1995).
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cally visible, hence potentially accessible to the public. 45 Today it is essentially taken for granted that with the application of technology, the course of
a pregnancy is “public” because it is visible.
The trial court ruled that the seizure was justified by the imminent risk
of harm to the child created by the expectant mother’s use of cocaine, and
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the verdict. The Court of Appeals
based its conclusion in part on “the admonition . . . that the common law
should be flexible enough to adopt itself to current medical and scientific
truths.” 46 It must be emphasized that the crucial point was not that Angela’s drug use was illegal—that would be a matter for a criminal trial—but
that her conduct, whatever its legality or illegality, constituted an “extreme
situation” of a future child’s exposure to foreseeable harms. In an earlier
era, Holmes observed that setting fire to one’s own house with the result
that a neighbor’s house is burned is counted as arson. “If that may be the
effect of setting fire to things which a man has a right to burn . . . why, on
principle, should it not be the effect of any other act which is equally likely
under the surrounding circumstances to cause . . . harm?” 47
When Angela M.W.’s case came to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the
decision was overturned on the narrow ground that the child protection statute was not intended to include a fetus. That same point of statutory construction was the basis for decision in Wisconsin v. Deborah J.Z., the case
with which this Paper began. Following these rulings, the Wisconsin state
legislature enacted an explicit authorization for the detention of pregnant
women in future like cases. 48
In recent years, there has been a spate of new criminal prosecutions
based on allegations of misconduct by pregnant women that risks endangering the welfare of a future born child.49 Many of these cases involve attempts to criminalize abortion, others involve a perceived new front in the
war on drugs. But their logic is based on the same ecological reasoning that
45. See ROBERTA H. BLANK, MOTHER AND FETUS: CHANGING NOTIONS OF MATERNAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1992); RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL
IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA (1999); Caroline Morris, Technology and the Legal Discourse of Fetal Autonomy, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 47 (1997).
46. State ex rel. Angela M.W, 541 N.W.2d at 488.
47. Holmes, supra note 30, at 54.
48. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.133 (West 2015) (adopted 1997) (“Jurisdiction over unborn
children in need of protection or services and the expectant mothers of those unborn children. The
court has exclusive original jurisdiction over an unborn child alleged to be in need of protection or
services which can be ordered by the court whose expectant mother habitually lacks self-control in
the use of alcohol beverages, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a
severe degree, to the extent that there is a substantial risk that the physical health of the unborn
child, and of the child when born, will be seriously affected or endangered unless the expectant
mother receives prompt and adequate treatment for that habitual lack of self-control. The court
also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the expectant mother of an unborn child described in
this section.”).
49. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 2, at 305–09.
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sees “foreseeable risk” as the basis for public intervention into what would
otherwise be private conduct. If it is not possible to articulate legal principles that define when the state may regulate the conduct of pregnant women, there equally will be no principled way to argue that a given attempt at
intervention has exceeded the bounds of such a definition. Furthermore,
there is no obvious reason why pregnancy should be the event that triggers
the state’s recognition of consequences, and hence of a state interest. Nutrition, work environments, or chemical exposures occurring well prior to
conception can plausibly be argued to create risks of negative consequences
for subsequently created children.
The argument is not purely hypothetical. In 1991, a California court
considered a claim of liability for harms caused to an eventual fetus by injuries sustained in a car accident two years prior to conception. Confronted
by that claim, Judge Woods of the Court of Appeals was moved to observe,
“through hindsight, everything is foreseeable.”50 The Court of Appeals upheld a ruling by the trial court that the duty of care could not extend to a
point in time prior to the existence of a fetus, but that decision is no more or
less logically consistent with an ecological model of harms than the opposite conclusion would have been, particularly in cases involving exposure to
hazardous substances rather than violent events. 51
III. “WE MUST LIVE ON THE NETWORK”
At one time, economic transactions were conceived as affecting only
those in privity with one another, those immediately involved in the event.
Later, the idea was accepted that each transaction occurs within a complex
system of economic markets, and each event has consequences that extend
throughout that system. The external stimulus for this new way of thinking
was new forms of economic activity and the prominence of new, social scientific ways of describing behavior in “the economy.” Once introduced, the
language of markets and systems extended beyond its original context of
economic behavior and affected reasoning about a range of social and physical conditions.
50. Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
51. A commonly discussed example is the issue of whether it is desirable to prevent women
of childbearing age from being exposed to lead. The Center for Disease Control is unequivocal:
“Primary and secondary prevention of lead exposure among females of childbearing age is needed
to avert neurobehavioral and cognitive deficits in their offspring.” Ctrs. for Disease Control, Lead
Exposure Among Females of Childbearing Age—United States, 2004, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. (Apr. 27, 2007), www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5616a4.htm. Where
private employers attempt to create such policies, however, issues of gender discrimination may
arise. See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). In contrast, European courts have found that national policies preventing women of childbearing age from working in environments characterized by exposure to lead or radiation are permissible. See LENIA
SAMUEL, FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS: CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 234–
35 (2d ed. 2002).
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At one time, conduct that did not immediately cause injury to an identifiable individual was assumed to be self-regarding. Later the idea was accepted that the well-being of ecologies as well as economies are affected by
the ripple effects of localized events. The stimulus for this new way of
thinking was the increasingly visible consequences of widespread deployment of chemical agents into the physical environment, and a biological
sciences-based political movement that promoted new ways of describing
harms to “the environment.” Once introduced, models of ecological causation and harm extended beyond their original context of pollution to describe a wide range of activities having to do with health and welfare.
Each of these shifts in thinking had dramatic consequences for the legal construction of the public/private divide. Private law doctrines of tort
liability, the scope of public regulation, and constitutional analysis all were
affected by the extension of the consequentialist model of “public” by the
adoption of new models of thinking about consequences. The basic liberal
calculus of balancing consequences to others against the intrusion on personal autonomy remains the same, but in each case the underlying conception of “consequences” underwent a profound change. These are shifts, in
other words, in legal epistemology, not merely in legal doctrine.
It is plausible that we presently are living during another moment of
such an epistemological shift. This time the expanded system of consequential interactions involves not money or chemicals, but information. I
do not mean to focus on the actions of government, for example, spying on
our cell phone conversations. Certainly, new surveillance technologies
drive consideration of old questions in new contexts, whether those technologies involve microphones or heat sensors. 52 But the “threat,” if that is
the word, to our present model of public and private as those terms relate to
information may be more easily seen in a less obvious, less ominous question. Assume that at a given moment there is a piece of information about
me that is legally classified as “private” and consequently subject to various
constitutional and statutory protections. What are the consequences for the
status of that information if I voluntarily share it with someone else?
The framing of the question reveals that it is based on a way of thinking about information and privacy that is increasingly irrelevant to the conditions of modern life. The phrase “a piece of information” speaks to a
conception of data as a collection of discrete facts that can be considered
separately from one another, analogous to traditional forms of property. In
52. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). It is interesting to note that Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion in that case focused on the question of whether a particular technology
of surveillance was widely in use such that one could plausibly expect its existence to be factored
into the assessment of a “reasonable” expectation of privacy. The application of this principle to
the Internet raises the disturbing possibility that at some point in the future (if not the present)
where people conduct a significant portion of their lives online there will be no limits to the government’s utilization of online information.

224

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:210

addition, the ideas of “voluntary” and “sharing” are of limited use. This
was already evident in the discussion of the cases involving pregnancy, as
legal and medical requirements of seeking appropriate care meant exposure
of private information and the technologies of observation made the most
personal aspects of a pregnant woman’s bodily integrity publicly visible.
But even in that situation, the issue involved was information about the person. In the world of cyberspace, the information is the person; rather than
the selective disclosure of discrete bits of information, what is at issue is the
public exposure of the entirety of a person’s identity.
Return to the question of what is the legal significance of voluntarily
disclosing a piece of personal information. The traditional answer is that
once a piece of information is voluntarily shared, it is open to any and all
use. There are gray areas, to be sure, forms of disclosure for legally recognized restricted purposes (for example, medical diagnosis and intellectual
property), but they are special instances that reflect the boundary work involved in maintaining the basic distinction. The basic, traditional model is
what might be called the “conversation” model. I say something to you in a
conversation, that information is yours. Just as Mill said, there are social
conventions against gossip that may limit the use you make of that information, but there is no invasion of my legal rights if you choose to repeat
my words to others. By the same token, what I say to a reporter, write in a
blog post, or write on a t-shirt for all to see is information that has passed
out of my legal sphere of control. In this traditional approach information
is treated as a form of property. When I have voluntarily surrendered ownership of an object—as in the case of giving a gift—the recipient now
“owns” that object. The key is that I voluntarily chose to share the information; for that reason, there is no invasion of “privacy.”
Part of the assumption of this model is that the circle of shared information is localized. But cyberspace is obviously different. In cyberspace,
all the information in all the world is joined in a single complex system, a
“network” that connects communicative acts just as an economy connects
individual behaviors or an ecology describes the connections among life
forms occupying a biological system. The old property ownership-based
model of public and private communication is severely tested by this development, and a new legal epistemology of public and private is needed. To
see why, consider cases of revenge pornography and “Squeaky Dolphin.”
A. Revenge Pornography
In 2014, Illinois became the sixteenth state to adopt a law criminalizing “revenge porn,” the nonconsensual posting of intimate material.53 Unlike most earlier versions of such statutes adopted in other states, the Illinois
53. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5 (West 2015).
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law contains no specific intent requirement, no nudity is required, and the
statute applies to images created by the victim herself as well as to pictures
taken by others. Victims’ advocate and lawyer Carrie Goldberg hailed the
innovations in the statute:
So much is said about how laws butt up against free speech, . . .
but if we lose the expectation of privacy in taking images meant
only for someone we trust, then we lose another valuable form of
speech: our private speech. There is nothing wrong with taking
pictures of yourself that are meant only for another person you
trust. 54
Supporters of the law point to the need to bring the reality of virtual life under scrutiny for its real life consequences:
If we’re to tackle the problem, we need to stop viewing the
[I]nternet as “virtual” reality. We need to recogni[z]e that the
[I]nternet is a real, tangible location for rights violations. For victims of revenge porn, there is nothing “virtual” about their experience. There is nothing “virtual” about moving house, changing
your name, being stalked, or committing suicide. Revenge porn
has struck a vein of misogynist gold, which has found a powerful
voice on the [I]nternet. It’s a voice which is no less harmful
merely because it speaks through a screen. 55
Some commentators have suggested that these cases do not require anything particularly novel in the way of legal responses; application of criminal statutes or an extension of copyright law principles might be sufficient. 56 But the larger point is that as far as the legal construction of
“public” is concerned, the decision to present a loved one with an intimate
image as a gift is not distinguishable from the decision to appear as the
model in a centerfold—except that the latter image is subject to greater legal protections by virtue of commercial contracts, copyright, and the protectable interests of the publisher.
Both the phenomenon of revenge porn and the very valid concerns that
it raises point to questions that go beyond the formulation of a prosecutorial
54. Barbara Herman, Illinois Passes Revenge Porn Law with Teeth: ‘Other States Should
Copy,’ Says Privacy Lawyer, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015) http://www.ibtimes.com/illinoispasses-revenge-porn-law-teeth-other-states-should-copy-says-privacy-lawyer-1774974. A review
of other revenge porn statutes is available at Press Releases, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE,
http://www.cybercivilrights.org/press_releases (last visited Aug. 8, 2015).
55. Bernard Keenan, Revenge Porn: Human Rights Online, THE LONDON SCH. OF ECON. &
POL. SCI. (May 17, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2014/05/17/revenge-porn-humanrights-online/.
56. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 (2014) (arguing that
copyright law can be extended to cover voluntary sharing of intimate images); Jenna K. Stokes,
The Indecent Internet: Resisting Unwarranted Internet Exceptionalism in Combating Revenge
Porn, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 929 (2014) (arguing that existing criminal laws can be effectively
applied to the Internet).
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strategy. The real question is how we make sense in a world of global cyberspace of established categories of private and public communication.
The problem is that the technology of communication and reproduction alters the nature, not merely the scale, of the disclosure. In the past, letters
could be published, conversations could be repeated, but they could not
readily be turned into eternal archives of personal exposure available to the
current and future population of the planet. Furthermore, it is not an adequate response to say that these are unfortunate side effects of a generally
valid principle of publicity. Many of the principled reasons for supporting
publicity in general make little or no sense in the current context. “Sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants,” said Brandeis, and we understand the
context of his statement. 57 But what does the same sentiment mean in other
contexts? Is “disinfection” the only priority? Is “disinfecting” the only
thing sunlight does, or should we also be concerned about skin cancer?
What does “best” mean?
Consider, for example, the online availability of court filings. In general, the idea that court filings should be public documents is rooted in the
idea that secret court proceedings are instruments of tyranny. But while
“publicly available” in an archive means one thing, “publicly available”
online means something else entirely. Papers filed in lawsuits have become
matters of massive public examination, meaning that unsubstantiated allegations, embarrassing details, painful memories, and deeply personal conflicts must be available to millions of viewers as a resulting cost of open access to the courts. These unintended forms of publication are not only
unfair to defendants who may be ultimately found to be blameless, they impose burdens on plaintiffs in the form of unwanted publicity that are having
the effect of discouraging victims from coming forward. 58 The equation of
values that made sense of the old idea that a voluntary release of information for a particular purpose made that information “public” does not
seem to adequately capture the concerns of the Internet age.
Unwanted, unanticipated, and massive publicity is only one side of the
coin. Another side is the fact that the Internet, despite its information hierarchies and security protocols, is ultimately one network. That means that
it is not only information that is released, it is patterns of information, or information about the release of information.

57. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10,
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1910/1913_12_20_
What_Publicity_Ca.pdf.
58. Jodi Kantor, “Lawsuits” Lurid Details Draw an Online Crowd, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/us/lawsuits-lurid-details-draw-an-onlinecrowd.html?_r=0.
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B. Total Identity and Squeaky Dolphin
Among the many (known and as yet unknown) government and private projects aimed at collecting and analyzing data about individuals, one
stands out as an illustration of the idea of this paper. The SuperIdentity
Project is a joint effort of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and six British universities. 59 It is headquartered
at the University of Southampton. The idea of the project is to take the partial bits of identifying information that appear in different places and put
them together to create a core “superidentity” that not only enables observers to track individuals as they move across different social media or cybernetic locations, but actually determines the authentic core of the identity of
the person. “The assumption underlying this project is that, whilst there
may be many dimensions to an identity—some more stable than others—all
should ultimately refer back to a single core identity—the source or ‘superidentity.’” 60
The program explicitly draws on psychological theories and combines
multiple forms of measurement—biometric, biographic, and cybermetric—
to create an identity profile. For example, the personality characteristic of
‘extroversion’ might predict a long stride length or hand gestures, firm
pressure in a mobile phone swipe gesture or keystroke depression, or a large
online presence with multiple friend sets in multiple cyberspace locations.
By combining these bits of information into a psychological profile, the individual’s superidentity, as individual as a fingerprint, can ultimately be
constructed. 61 Moreover, although these psychological profiles do not
make it possible to track known suspects, they can be used to predict potential criminal or terrorist activity. As Peter Galison puts it, “the race is on to
anticipate other future preferences and actions from crimes, voting, and dating to terrorism.” 62 As the NSA memorandum introducing the program
announced, “we must live on the network.” 63
59. See
SuperIdentity:
About
the
Project,
UNIV.
OF
SOUTHAMPTON,
http://www.southampton.ac.uk/superidentity/about/index.page? (last visited Aug. 14, 2015); Sue
Black et al., SuperIdentity: Fusion of Identity Across Real and Cyber Domains (ID360 Conference, Working Paper, 2012), http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/336645. The discussion in this Section was
inspired by the 2014 Tanner Lectures in Human Values delivered by Peter Galison at Cambridge
University. See Peter Galison, Address at the University of Cambridge Tanner Lectures on Human Values: The Gesticulating Disquiet of Those Reduced to Silence (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://upload.sms.cam.ac.uk/media/1853532; Peter Galison, Address at the University of Cambridge Tanner Lectures on Human Values: We Must Live on the Network (Nov. 25, 2014)
http://upload.sms.cam.ac.uk/media/1853576 [hereinafter Galison, We Must Live On the Network].
60. Galison, We Must Live On the Network, supra note 59, at 7.
OF
SOUTHAMPTON,
61. See
SuperIdentity
Stimulus
Database,
UNIV.
http://www.southampton.ac.uk/superidentity/ssd/ssdhomepage.page (last visited Aug. 13, 2015).
62. Galison, We Must Live on the Network, supra note 59.
63. Id.
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One particularly interesting part of the SuperIdentity Project is
Squeaky Dolphin. Squeaky Dolphin is a program that collects information
across social media by using identified stable personality traits as markers.
This is part tracking and part projecting; patterns of psychological traits derived from observation lead to superidentity markers that make it possible
to track people across social media, from which multiple observations are
then fed back into the superidentity model.
What makes Squeaky Dolphin so interesting is the proposition that, in
conjunction with the larger project, it enables the analysts to know their
subjects better than they know themselves. That is, the superidentity is constructed by bringing together the fractured identities that individuals embody (irony intended) in their online persona. It is commonplace for individuals to “be” one person on Facebook, another on a dating site, a third
and fourth in other areas of their lives. The advent of the Internet in this
way only accelerated a phenomenon that has been associated with modernity by sociologists and social psychologists for decades. But a superidentity
is the inescapable core of our being that lurks beneath all the different exercises in self-expression.
None of the elements of the SuperIdentity Project represent an “invasion of privacy” in its classic sense. All of this depends on the collection of
information that the individual has willingly shared with the world, it is only the particular use to which the information is put that is disquieting. Revenge porn presents the spectacle of willingly shared information unwillingly made public; Squeaky Dolphin points toward the spectacle of
information unknowingly made public, and even unknown to the very individual involved. If there is a desire to conceive of a legal public/private
barrier that identifies something “wrong” with the Squeaky Dolphin program it cannot depend on the question of whether there was consent in the
conversational model. The revenge porn case at least involves a situation of
a conversation under expected conditions of privacy, and perhaps it can be
reached by an extension of something like copyright doctrine prohibiting
nonconsensual use of images created with an expectation of privacy. But
that formulation does not begin to touch Squeaky Dolphin, let alone the
next generational iteration of this form of behavioral profiling or the one after that. Just as we learned to accept that economic behavior occurs within
a larger market, and the release of chemicals occurs within a biological ecosystem, we are learning that our identities and our acts of self-expression
take place on a network whether we want them to or not.
IV. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE RECONSIDERED AGAIN: AN EMERGENT
LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY
The theme of this Paper has been that change in the understanding of
the public/private divide reflects a shift in legal epistemology. In the case
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of the network, the shift is from information as a form of property to information as an element of identity. The idea has been taken up by a number
of individuals and groups considering the impact of networked information
on legal thinking. The Future of Identity in the Information Society
(“FIDIS”) is a “Network of Excellence,” a nonlocal academic consortium
established by the European Council.64 In a booklet titled Identy in a Networked World, FIDIS provides a provocative illustration of their argument
in an essay and in a graphic representation. 65 The essay explains the idea
that “John” should have control over the aspects of his information that
make up his total identity, and subsequent resharing or retransmission of
that information ought not to be allowed. The governments involved,
FIDIS argues, have an affirmative obligation to establish legal regimes to
make this possible.
As a legal proposition, the model in the FIDIS illustration is wildly alien to standard American understandings. But the basic conceptual elements are not. The idea of an affirmative state obligation to provide a
meaningful form of “privacy” has been raised by numerous political and legal theorists in the context of a feminist critique of the inadequacies of a
model of privacy as merely negative liberty. 66 As Zillah Eisenstein puts it,
“[t]he dilemma of privacy is that the state should not have the last word on
who gets to have privacy, and yet the state must play a role in affirming its
actual availability.” 67 Speaking from a neorepublican perspective, Patricia
Boling emphasizes that citizens need political and private categories of life
as “important parts of the process of nurturing democratic citizens,”68 an
argument that echoes Jean Bethke Elshtain’s emphasis on the private sphere
as “a locus of human activity, moral reflection, social and historical relations, the creation of meaning, and the construction of identity having its
own integrity.” 69
In legal discourse, European courts have begun to wrestle with alternative ways of thinking about the public/private divide in ways that go farther
to take into account the market, ecological, and network understandings of
“public” than most American courts have yet been willing to go. There is
no reference to “privacy” in the European Convention on Human Rights,
64. FIDIS, http://www.fidis.net/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2015).
65. To view an insightful graphic of this idea, see Marit Hansen, User Controlled Identity
Management: The Future of Privacy, in Future of Identity in IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD:
USE
AND
CASE
SENARIOS
5
(Sabine
Delaitre
ed.,
2006),
http://www.fidis.net/resources/networked-world/.
66. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999).
67. Zillah Eisenstein, Equalizing Privacy and Specifying Equality, in REVISIONING THE
POLITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL
THEORY, supra note 5, at 181, 187.
68. PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POLITICS OF INTIMATE LIFE 4 (1996).
69. JEAN BETHKE ELSHSTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT 322 (2d ed.1993).
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but Article 8 secures a right to “private life” and other articles mention the
concept of “private” in passing. 70 Article 8’s protections are understood to
guarantee “a sphere within which [the individual] can freely pursue the development and fulfillment of his personality,” the “right to establish and
develop relationships with other human beings.” 71 Retention of information
collected in criminal investigations, in turn, is limited to two years. 72
The European Court of Human Rights has declared that Article 8 imposes affirmative obligations as well as negative limitations on interference:
[I]n addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be
positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private
life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the
relations of individuals between themselves. . . . The boundaries
between the State’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable
principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both instances
regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the competing interests.73
The phrase “private life” covers “the physical and psychological integrity of a person, . . . aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity, . . . a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world.”74
Famously, this flexible right has recently been held to include a “right
to be forgotten,” established in a European Union Directive 75 and applied
by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) to require private companies such
as Google to remove links to information on request under appropriate cir70. The word “private” appears five times: in Article 6 as an element of a right to a fair trial,
in which public access to trials may be limited “where the interests of juveniles or the protection
of the private life of the parties so require;” in Article 8 (below); in Article 9, in which freedom of
conscience and religion includes the right “either alone or in community with others and in public
or private to manifest his religion or belief,” and in Article 5, in a reference to quality between
spouses which states that “spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a private
law character between them and in their relations with their children.” European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 6, 8 & 9, Apr. 11, 1950,
C.E.T.S. 5.
71. L. Doswald-Beck, The Meaning of the “Right to Respect Life” Under European Convention on Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. 283, 287, 298 (1983) (first quoting Application No. 8307/78
DR21, 124; then quoting Application No. 6825/74 DR5, 87).
72. See generally, Francesca Bignami, Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The Data Retention Directive, 8 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 233, 242, 251 (2007); Doswald-Beck, supra
note 71, at 283.
73. Odièvre v. France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 24 (internal citations omitted).
74. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R.33.
75. Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).

2015]

LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGIES

231

cumstance. The ECJ opinion focused on the issues of information and its
role in a networked world:
The Court observes, furthermore, that this information potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and
that, without the search engine, the information could not have
been interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty.
Internet users may thereby establish a more or less detailed profile of the person searched against. Furthermore, the effect of the
interference with the person’s rights is heightened on account of
the important role played by the internet and search engines in
modern society, which render the information contained in such
lists of results ubiquitous. In the light of its potential seriousness,
such interference cannot, according to the Court, be justified by
merely the economic interest which the operator of the engine has
in the data processing.
However, inasmuch as the removal of links from the list of results could, depending on the information at issue, have effects
upon the legitimate interest of internet users potentially interested
in having access to that information, the Court holds that a fair
balance should be sought in particular between that interest and
the data subject’s fundamental rights, in particular the right to
privacy and the right to protection of personal data.76
The idea that seems to be emerging from all of this is something on the
order of an obligation on the part of governments to create conditions in
which individuals can engage in “user-controlled identity management.” 77
In the same way that regulation of economic relations created a set of conditions for meaningful economic decisionmaking by workers and consumers, and environmental health regulations give individuals the ability to control the health qualities of their environment, governments need to have the
ability to engage in transnational cooperative efforts to create conditions in
which individuals have the ability to make meaningful decisions about the
disclosure of their information in the network. The pregnancy cases remind
us that new forms of conceiving of the legal consequences of individual
conduct carry risks of overly intrusive regulation as well as potential benefits. And the pregnancy cases also remind us that nothing is ever resolved:
the difficult decisions about the scope of economic and environmental regulation that is consistent with constitutionally guaranteed liberties are with us
today, and issues arising out of attempts to secure autonomy within a global
76. Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, An Internet Operator Is Responsible for the Processing that it Carries Out of Personal Data Which Appear on Web Pages Published
by Third Parties (May 30, 2014), http:// curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201405/cp140070en.pdf.
77. Marit Hansen, supra note 65, at 4.
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informational network will likewise raise difficult questions. But it seems
evident that the traditional legal epistemology of public and private information are inadequate to make sense of the questions posed by the conditions of life on the network. We are participants in markets, we occupy
ecologies, and we live on the network.

